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Abstract
We perform an experimenta linvestigation using a dictator game in
which individuals must make a moral decision —to give or not to give an
amount of money to poor people in the Third World. A questionnaire in
which the subjects are asked about the reasons for their decision shows
that, at least in this case, moral motivations carry a heavy weight in the
decision: the majority of dictators give the money for reasons of a con-
sequentialist nature. Based on the results presented here and of other
analogous experiments, we conclude that dicator behavior can be under-
stood in terms of moral distance rather than social distance and that it
systematically deviates from the egoism assumption in economic models
and game theory.
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1 Introduction
In recent years interest has grown in the so-called field of experimental philoso-
phy. Experimental philosophy attempts to substantiate the claim that philoso-
phy in general, and ethical theory in particular, must be increasingly grounded
in sound empirical investigation (Darwall et al. 1992). This claim often goes
hand in hand with the discrediting of the armchair intuitions and mental exper-
iments commonplace to philosophy. Notwithstanding, experimental philosophy
continues to be grounded in traditional philosophy in at least two ways (Sosa
2007, 99). On the one hand, it puts into question people’s beliefs, what people
believe intuitively. On the other, it challenges the truth of these beliefs. To this
we must add the questioning of theories that appeal to people’s intuitions to
justify their aﬃrmations. All of this can be achieved by means of philosophical
experiments designed to this eﬀect. But experimental philosophy has walked a
short path and has yet to accumulate suﬃcient empirical information. Although
there remains much work to be done in experimental philosophy, we needn’t
start from scratch. Indeed, there is a vast amount of experimental literature in
economics and psychology that can be given -and is given- a philosophical use.
In the case of economics, when the assumption of self-interested behavior is
revised experimentally, ‘a surprisingly large amount of other-regarding behavior
is the common finding’ (Bohnet and Frey 1999, 335). This surprising finding
has led many economists to challenge the underlying basis of their discipline
and propose a new line of research -behavioral economics- in which people’s
actual possible motivations, aside from self-interest, are analyzed in the context
of economic decision-making. Thus we find that moral motivations such as
fairness, sense of moral obligation, moral imperatives, generosity, reciprocity,
and altruism are often activated to explain the other-regarding behavior that
is inevitably found in the ultimatum game, the trust game, or in the dictator
game, in spite of economic predictions to the contrary. It is precisely here, then,
where experimental philosophy encounters a good point of departure.
This article analyzes qualitative data arising from an economic-philosophical
experiment using a dictator game in which dictators are asked to explain the
reasons for their decisions in a clearly moral context. In the following section,
an overview is given of the results of well-known experiments on the dictator
game. As we will see, many experimentalists resort to hypotheses of a marked
moral character to explain the decisions made by dictators. In the third section
we present the experimental design by Brañas-Garza (2006) and summarize the
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quantitative results of his experiments in order to analyze the qualitative results
in depth, that is, the responses given by dictators regarding their reasons for
action that were not analyzed in the above article. In section four we discuss
these results and defend the hypothesis that dictators’ responses are determined
by the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient; a distance that
permits us to classify the behaviors that may arise in the dictator game. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in the fifth section.
2 Dictator Games and Moral Context
In standard dictator game (DG) experiments, one of the players, the dictator,
is given a fixed amount of money and a set of instructions. The instructions
explain that the money has been assigned to two players -the dictator and the
recipient- but that only the dictator is entitled to decide how much money to
keep and how much money to give to the recipient. In this simple situation,
there are at least three sources of information relevant to the decision: i) in-
formation related to the dictator herself, i.e., whether or not the decision is
observed by others; ii) information the dictator receives about the recipient;
and iii) information derived from the game framing and the language used in
the instructions. Previous papers have shown that the outcome of a DG changes
considerably depending on the type of information provided by the experimen-
talists. For instance, when the dictator makes the decision under conditions of
absolute privacy and anonymity and has no information about the recipient,
nearly no one donates anything. Donations tend to be very low, around 10%
of the pie on average. However, when the dictator receives reliable information
regarding the recipient, even while keeping anonymity constant, donations in-
crease. When no information is available about the recipient, the dictator may
have doubts as to the recipient’s existence and therefore have no reason to share
the money. In contrast, when dictators were shown pictures of the recipients in
a particular experiment, up to 25% of the subjects gave as much as half of the
total amount, although 58% of them kept all the money for themselves. In an-
other experiment, the dictators were told that their donation would be given to
the Red Cross. Thirty-one percent of the dictators in this experiment gave part
of the money (17% gave half of the amount), while 10% gave the full amount.
Oﬀers also increased when the dictators were told the recipient’s surname, when
they received proof of the actual existence of recipients, or when they were told
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that the recipient was a fellow classmate. These experiments have shown that
if conditions of anonymity are relaxed, e.g., dictator’s behavior and/or relevant
information about the recipients are revealed, donations will be higher, although
the full amount of money will never be donated -with the exception of the Red
Cross experiment. The empirical results of these experiments are summarized
in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Average donations in previous DG experiments
Paper Information Pie Donation (%)
Nothing = 50 Full amount
HMS-96 – 10 x 1$ 63.8 8.0 0.0
EG-96 Red Cross 10 x 1$ 27.0 31.2 10.0
FOM1-01 Classmate 100 points 26.0 43.0 0.0
FOM2-01 Existence known 10 x 1$ 35.2 41.1 5.0
CG-03 Surname 10 x 1$ 47.3 26.3 0.0
B-03 Photo 10 x 1$ 58.3 25.5 0.0
PBG-forth. Moral framing 10 x 0.5C= 3.85 76.9 19.2
Sources: Hoﬀman et al. (1996); Eckel and Grossman (1996); Frohlich et al. (2001);
Charness and Gneezy (2003); Burnham (2003); Brañas-Garza (forthcoming)
The language used in the instructions is yet another factor that may deter-
mine the outcome of the experiment. For example, the fact that subjects are
told that they are participating in an experiment may make them lose interest
in their partner, or may cause subjects to feel that they are playing a game -
that it is a competition and they must therefore win, that is, keep all or part of
the money for themselves (Frohlich et al. 2004). The nature of the payments,
the presence or absence of the experimentalists, the possibility of taking part
in future experiments -and thus winning more money- may also determine the
outcome (Bolton et al. 1998).
The aim of these experiments is to measure the prosocial conduct or other-
regarding preferences revealed by the subjects, thus challenging the assumption
of self-interested behavior. The supposition that individuals will attempt to
maximize their own benefits, a standard assumption in economics, could lead
to the conclusion that no one will give anything in the DGs since giving noth-
ing is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the DG. However, as we have
seen, subjects often deviate from this prediction in the laboratory setting. In
light of these experimental results, several hypotheses have been developed to
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explain these deviations. Hoﬀman et al. (1996) show that as anonymity is re-
laxed, donations increase. In the opinion of these authors, this is due to the fact
that anonymity generates “social distance”, which they define as ‘the degree of
reciprocity that subjects believe exist within a social interaction’ (Hoﬀman et
al. 1996, 654). The social isolation or lack of sense of community produced by
anonymity leads to the predominance of self-interested behavior. Nonetheless,
the hypothesis of social distance has been widely criticized. The concept of
reciprocity, for example, is employed in a very broad sense since in reality the
DG does not pose so much a problem of reciprocity -in that the recipient can
do nothing- as one of subject identifiability. Indeed, it is identifiability that de-
termines behavior (Bohnet and Frey 1999). Many experiments have shown that
it is not so much the degree of dictator anonymity that determines donations,
but rather the information that the dictator has about the recipient.1 Thus, for
example, in an extensive article in which several hypotheses are reviewed to ex-
plain donations in dictator games and others are proposed, Bolton et al. (1998)
argue that if I know nothing about the other person, if I give her the money I
can err in her favor, but I prefer to err in my favor because I am not a saint (the
"I’m-no-saint" hypothesis). According to these authors, however, the hypothe-
ses that explain DG donations are unclear when the dictator has information
about the recipient. It should be noted that Bolton et al. (1998) do not find ev-
idence for what they call the kindness hypothesis, according to which ‘dictators
might be motivated to give a gift for one or more of many reasons: e.g., a sense of
moral obligation, pleasure derived from giving, to demonstrate kindness’ (283).
This hypothesis, however, encompasses very distinct motivations that must be
analyzed separately. While the pleasure of giving or demonstrating kindness are
greatly aﬀected by anonymity -in that the recipient does not know if I give or
do not give takes away the pleasure of giving and does not allow the dictator to
demonstrate that she is kind- moral obligation is not aﬀected by anonymity but
rather by the lack of information about the recipient’s actual situation. In the
classic Hoﬀman et al. (1996) experiment, and in the majority of experiments
along these lines, the complete lack of information about the recipient removes
the necessary conditions to donate out of a sense of moral obligation:
By imposing double anonymity, HMSS [Hoﬀman et al., 1994] have
removed virtually all motivation for donating money to one’s part-
1The importance of nonneutral framings in the dictator game has recently been pointed
out by List (2007).
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ner. The decision makers cannot identify each other, nor do they
have enough information to know if their partner is poor or oth-
erwise deserving of their generosity; thus there is little or no basis
for altruism to play a part in the decision. We assert that fairness
and altruism require context: the circumstances of the recipient de-
termine what is the fair or appropriate charitable action to take.
In the Hoﬀman et al. (1994) study, the information available to
the Proposer is unlikely to motivate charitable behavior (Eckel and
Grossman 1996, 183, 184).
If, as Eckel and Grossman have shown, altruistic behavior requires an ap-
propriate context, which is inexistent in most experiments, what would happen
if the dictator makes a decision in an easily recognizable moral context; a con-
text in which dictators have information, for example, about their partner’s
poverty or illness? In Eckel and Grossman’s experiment, in which as we have
seen the partner is the Red Cross, donations increase, but not in a spectacular
way2. Donations increase much more when the money that the dictator can
distribute is the result of the joint eﬀort of both the dictator and the partner
given that in this case ‘social pressures, moral imperatives, and the warm glow
of giving are likely to magnify the reward to skillful or deserving Recipients’
(Ruﬄe 1998, 259). As Ruﬄe points out, the results of this experiment contra-
dict Hoﬀman et al.’s claim that other-regarding preferences have to do with “an
expectations phenomenon” and not with “an autonomous private preference for
equity” (1994, 348).
Moral preferences, the sense of moral obligation, moral imperatives or equity
appear repeatedly in discussions on the outcomes of a diverse range of DG ex-
periments. Yet in spite of the fact that donations increase in these experiments,
we cannot speak with any certainty about dictators’ reasons for giving as the
only thing we know for sure is the preference that has been revealed in the
decision, that is, whether the dictator gave or did not give. Indeed, aside from
the theoretical speculations of experimentalists, we do not know why dictators
give. With a view to bridging this gap, in the following section we present two
experiments (a hypothetical one and a real one) in which the moral context is
easily recognizable and in which dictators are expressly asked about the rea-
sons for their action. We can then determine if the kindness hypothesis is to
2Not giving money to the Red Cross is not necessarily a sign of a lack of altruism, generosity,
prosocial behavior or the sense of moral obligation, as many people may have doubts about
the eﬃciency of the Red Cross and not give anything.
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some degree certain: either because the dictators take pleasure in giving, give
to demonstrate kindness or give out of a sense of moral obligation.
3 Two moral dictator games: Design and results
To analyze to what degree the number of donors and the size of donations
increase in a moral context, we need to study a DG situation in which the moral
structure of the problem is set out in a clear manner.3 This requires dictators
having relevant moral information about the recipient, that is, a context in which
they are able to identify the moral nature of their decision. The instructions
must prevent dictators from thinking that they are just playing a game, or that
the recipients do not actually exist. The two experiments presented below fulfil
these conditions.
3.1 Design and quantitative results of the experiments4
The first experiment was conducted with 75 students from the University of
Cordoba (Spain) in November 2002. Subjects were asked to collaborate in a
research study on the problems that arise when trying to distribute non-divisible
and finite goods. We avoided using the term “experiment” in order to dispel the
possible negative eﬀects of the word. Once the study was explained, the subjects
received a large envelope containing the following items: a small envelope, three
5C= bills, a questionnaire, instructions and a sheet with 341 numerical codes;
three of which were marked with a circle5. In the instructions, the students
were informed that the 341 codes appearing on the sheet referred to centers
3A salient feature of the DG is what Dana et al. (2007) call "transparence": the dictator
clearly observes the consequences of her actions and the responsability is not easily diﬀused.
4This section (3.1) is simply a summary of the data analyzed in depth in Brañas-Garza
(2006). This is necessary so that the reader can gain a better understanding of the analysis of
the qualitative data that were not included in the work by Brañas-Garza and that we discuss
here. For the statistical analysis of both experiments see Brañas-Garza (2006).
5The size of the envelope permitted the subjects to carry out the operations in complete
privacy. The money and the questionnaire were placed in the small envelope where the centers
were marked. The subjects then stood up and placed the envelope in a box. The subjects’
names did not appear anywhere and they kept the large envelope. After they were given the
instructions they were told the following: “Only you will know what is in the large envelope”
(the money that remained). After allocating the money, the subjects stood up, placed the
small, sealed envelope (containing their choice, the money and the questionnaire) in the box
and left the room. The subjects were not paid for participating in the experiment. None of the
researchers (experimenters) that ran the experiment were professors at the universities where
the experiments were performed and had not had any previous contact with the students. To
improve the credibility of both studies, the dean of the school introduced us at the beginning
of each session and left the room.
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that receive medicines in Asia, Africa and South America, that they had been
assigned three of these centers and that for every 5C= they donated, a box of
medicines would be sent to one of “their” three centers. All of the subjects in
the experiment had to write the three codes on their small envelope and circle
the centers —a maximum of three— to which they allotted the 5C= in medicines.
The subjects were also told that they were entitled to keep 5C= for participating
in the research study on the distribution of goods. Logically, if they kept 5C=
for themselves, one of the centers would not receive any medicines (in this case
they were told to circle only two of the three centers that had been assigned to
them). The procedure was performed under conditions of complete anonymity
by means of a double-blind mechanism similar to that described by Hoﬀman et
al. (1996). The questionnaire included questions regarding sex, age, the weekly
allowance given to them by their parents (none of the experimental subjects -all
of whom were university students- had a paying job), and the reasons for their
decision. This last question read: “Could you please tell me the reasons for your
decision in the problem posed here?”.
Using the same instructions and under identical conditions of anonymity,
a second experiment was performed in March 2003 with 98 students from the
University of Jaén (Spain). The subjects were placed in four groups. This
experiment was hypothetical as the subjects were not given real money and had
to decide how to divide the amount hypothetically by responding to a series of
questions. Furthermore, the decision in this second experiment was made under
three distinct scenarios which were presented to them in a random manner:
a) No information about the recipients.
b) Information revealing that the recipients were poor people from the Third
World.
c) Similar to b, but informing subjects that the money would be used to buy
medicines.
The main results of the experiments are shown in Table 2 below.
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Table 2: Two moral dictator game experiments
Amount given Hypothetical experiment Real experiment
C= No info Poverty Poverty + Drugs Poverty + Drugs
15 0% 40.8% 68.3% 74.6%
10 0% 25.5% 18.3% 12%
5 28.6% 11.2% 5.1% 10.7%
0 71.4% 22.4% 8.1% 2.7%
N 98 98 98 75
As can be observed, the increase in the number of donors and donations is
spectacular compared to other experiments (see Table 1). As occurs in all the
experiments, when subjects lack information about the recipient they hardly
give anything. However, as in this case they knew that the recipients were poor
or poor and in need of medicines, the majority of dictators gave all the money
-in spite of the fact that they were told in the instructions that they could
legitimately keep one 5C= bill for participating and donate the other two. As we
will see below, some of them did in fact keep the money, but only a few. Thus,
information about partners clearly has an eﬀect on donations to the same or to
a larger degree than dictator anonymity. But what drives dictators to donate?
What motives do they give for doing so -tastes, customs, traditions, religious
motives or moral reasons? Next subsection explores the main reasons given by
the participants in both experiments.
3.2 Qualitative results
As we have pointed out in the introduction, in this paper we are interested
in how subjects explain their behavior after taking part in a dictator game.
To this end, the experiments considered here are particularly appropriate since
contrary to standard experimental dictator games, our experiments trigger an
amazing amount of altruistic behavior. But before analyzing the claims made
by the subjects, let us recall two features of the experimental design that have
contributed to the prominence of unselfish behaviors. Whereas the first is just a
methodological question, the second leads us to the kind of philosophical claim
that we shall make in this paper.
Firstly, the results are somewhat special because participants did not face
the standard continuum choice of how to divide a pie, but instead had to decide
how to distribute three 5C= bills among diﬀerent potential recipients (see Brañas-
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Garza 2006). As we can observe in Table 2, the majority of participants (75%)
allocate the full endowment to the recipients in the real experiment. This is
quite interesting for our analysis as it permits us to explore the reasons of a
large number of participants who decided to give the money.
Secondly, and more interestingly, the experiment posed a “moral dilemma”
to test how telling dictators that the recipients were poor and needy triggered
altruistic behavior. This is the kind of design that allows moral motivations
such as fairness and altruism to play a role (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). Thus,
although these are rather atypical dictator results, they are the kind of results
that permit us to explore moral motivations in depth. Having clarified this, we
will now concentrate on the main arguments provided by the participants.
3.2.1 The prominence of consequentialist arguments
Consequentialist reasons predominate among the answers given by participants
in both the real and the hypothetical experiment. The dictators give all the
money because giving it has the most beneficial outcomes in terms of satisfying
needs. In the real experiment, 60% of the participants provide a consequen-
tialist argument (see Table 3). A complete list of answers can be found in the
Appendix.
Table 3: Reasons given by subjects in both experiments
Real experiment Hypothetical experiment6
Reason N % N %
Consequentialist 41 59.4 68 79.1
Deontological 14 20.3 4 4.6
Didn’t trust the system 4 5.8 3 3.5
Legitimacy 3 4.3 3 3.5
Random decision 3 4.3 0 0
Didn’t trust the experiment 2 2.9 0 0
Egoism/Hardship 2 2.9 8 9.3
Total 69 100.0 867 100.0
6The reasons from the hypothetical experiment correspond to the treatment in which the
participants have full information. We report only this treatment to make it comparable with
the real experiment.
7The number of answers is restricted to 69 in the real experiment and to 86 in the hypo-
thetical one since six and twelve participants, respectively, did nor provide any explanation
for their action.
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As we will see below, the immense majority of those who gave all the money
appealed to moral, consequentialist or deontological reasons 8. Responses based
on reasons of solidarity, equity, generosity or a sense of humanity are labelled as
deontological. Although we believe that these labels are not particularly precise
-dictators do not theorize, but express the reasons for their decision- a clear
diﬀerence can be seen between those who underline the beneficial consequences
of the action and those who appeal to the duty of giving. In other words, the
former are more concerned about what would have happened had they not given
the money (or what happens if they do), while the latter are more concerned
about what they should do.
The remaining labels reflect the various justifications provided by the dic-
tators for giving the full amount or not giving anything. Thus, for example,
some consider it legitimate to not give all the money (“legitimacy”) because
the experimental instructions permit them to do so: “You are entitled to keep
five euros, although this amount will depend on your decision [remember that
everything is absolutely anonymous]”. It is interesting to note that a large ma-
jority of the experimental subjects did not take this rule or "right" into account
and instead gave all the money, explaining their action in moral terms of a con-
sequentialist or deontological nature. Others, however, made their decisions in
a random manner, did not believe in the experiment, did not believe that the
money would reach its destination and thus did not give the money, or justified
their decision for clearly self-interested reasons. Nonetheless, the justifications
given for keeping part or all of the money are so varied and disperse that they
become quite insignificant in comparison to the consequentialist or deontological
reasons revealed by those who gave the full amount.
These results are confirmed by the findings obtained in the hypothetical
experiment. Similar to what occurs in the first experiment, the majority of
participants (79.1%) in the second experiment provide a consequentialist reason
similar to that of the real experiment (see Table 3).
Again the majority (83.7%) provided a moral reason to justify giving all
the money, although on this occasion the cases of self-interest increase, while
those appealing to deontological reasons decrease. This may be due to the
hypothetical nature of the experiment as it is more likely that dictators will keep
8Of the 55 cases that justified their donation in moral terms, only three kept the 5 euros
(see Table 5). We do not include them in the “legitimacy” category because they do not
justify the legitimacy of keeping part of the money, but the moral reasons for giving the rest
of it.
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all or part of the money when the decision does not have real consequences: as
no money is involved, no one who is needy will lose out. The data, however, do
not permit us to reach definitive conclusions on this question.
3.2.2 The importance of having a moral reason
Having a (moral) reason is decisive when facing a DG decision. In Table 4
the behavior of those who provide a moral reason —either consequentialist or
deontological— is compared with the behavior of those who do not provide this
kind of reason.
Table 4: Moral reasons and behavior
Number of bills given
Having a reason 0 1 2 3 Total
No reason 2 (10%) 7(35%) 7 (35%) 4 (20%) 20
Reason 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (5.5%) 52 (94.5%) 55
Almost all the participants who give the three 5C= bills provide a moral
reason for their behavior. Of course, this reveals nothing about the direction
of the causality and we cannot claim that their behavior is grounded in moral
reasons. But at least we can say that when they have to justify their actual
behavior they use a moral argument. Moreover, the diﬀerence in giving behavior
between those who provide a moral reason and those who do not is statistically
significant (X2 = 45.268, p < 0.001).
3.2.3 Behavioral diﬀerences between moral reasons
Having a moral reason to act is important in a dictator game, but are diﬀerent
reasons related to diﬀerent types of behaviors? In other words, does the giving
behavior of those who provide a consequentialist reason diﬀer from the behavior
of those who provide a deontological reason? Since all the participants that
provide a moral reason a posteriori give at least two bills, in Table 5 we study if
there are diﬀerences between consequentialist and deontological subjects when
deciding whether to allocate two or three bills to the recipient.
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Table 5: Diﬀerences in giving between consequentialists and deontologists
Number of bills given
Reason 2 3 Total
Consequentialist 2 (4.9%) 39 (95.1%) 41 (100.0%)
Deontological 1 (7.1%) 13 (92.9%) 14 (100.0%)
These results clearly show that the behavior of participants who provide a
consequentialist reason do not diﬀer from the behavior of those who provide a
deontological reason (X2 = 0.104, p = 0.747).
When carefully analyzing all of the answers given by consequentialists and
deontological subjects, we find only a minor diﬀerence, yet it is one that can be
interesting from a philosophical point of view. There is a positive correlation
between considering that the dictator experiment constitutes a “cheap deci-
sion”9 and giving a consequentialist argument (see Table 6). This correlation is
statistically significant (X2 = 7.359, p = 0.007).
Table 6: Considering the DG a cheap decision by moral reason
DG is a cheap decision
Reason No Yes Total
Consequentialist 18 (43.9%) 23 (51.6%) 41 (100.0%)
Deontological 12 (85.7%) 2 (14.3%) 14 (100.0%)
This can be explained by the fact that here we find two distinct types of
consequentialism: almost half of those who give all the money in the real exper-
iment (49%) justify their decision in terms of a non-neutral consequentialism
and one-third (32%) justify the reasons for their choice in terms of a neutral
or impersonal consequentialism restricted to impersonal values. Neutral con-
sequentialism is clearly presented by the subjects as the maximization of the
impersonal value in statements such as “the more people that have medicines
the better” or “this money is more useful in these countries” or “their scarcity”.
Non-neutral consequentialism is demonstrated in the choice of an action that
produces the best outcome, including one which will benefit the agent. The
experimental subjects manifested this in statements such as “I’m not losing
anything”, “the money isn’t mine, I didn’t earn it”, “they need it more than
me”, “it’s of more use to them than to me”, “it’s not going to do me any good”,
9This information (the decision being cheap) is also derived from the open-ended question
answered by subjects after taking part in the experimental sessions.
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“it benefits them more than me”, or “I didn’t have the money when I came and
I still don’t”. When ranking the possible outcomes from best to worst, decision-
theoretic consequentialists consider that keeping all or part of the money does
not benefit them in any way whatsoever —donating, then, is a cheap decision,
even a morally cheap one.
3.2.4 Moral dilemma and consequentialist reasons
The “moral dilemma” used in the experiment is a crucial part of our design.
Above we described how moral framing increases donations in a standard dic-
tator game. In addition, we explained how this moral framing triggers partic-
ipants’ moral reasons, especially consequentialist ones. In this last part of the
results we use the data from the hypothetical experiment to show how conse-
quentialist arguments are more common, the more morally loaded the framing.
Figure 1: Reasons by treatment in the hypothetical experiment
Figure 1 plots the reasons given by subjects to rationalize their behavior in
the hypothetical experiment. In this case, we have categorized the reasons given
by subjects when facing the three diﬀerent treatments: without moral framing,
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knowing that recipients are poor and knowing this fact and additionally knowing
that the money will be used to buy medicines. Figure 1 chiefly reveals three
facts. First, when subjects do not receive any information about the recipients,
almost 70% of them use this “lack of information” argument to justify their
(mainly self-interested) behavior. Second, when they know that the money
will be sent to poor countries, but do not know exactly where the money will
end up, more than 20% of them do not trust the system. In other words,
they are not sure if the money will be used for a good purpose. Third, the
more information they have, the more frequent the consequentialist reasons.
Thus, whereas almost no subject give a consequentialist reason when having no
information, this proportion rises to 50% when they know the recipients are poor
and to almost 70% when they know the money will be spent to buy medicines.
4 Discussion: social distance or moral distance?
Eckel and Grossman’s claim that if dictators are provided the appropriate con-
text they will have reasons to donate is more than fulfilled in Brañas-Garza
(2006), albeit the result would have to be supported by further "moral" experi-
ments. On the other hand, it may be too hasty to reject the kindness hypothesis
if we focus on one aspect of this hypothesis, that is, dictators’ sense of moral
obligation. Let us explore this aspect in greater detail.
First, like in many experiments, Brañas-Garza (2006) finds that dictator
anonymity is not a crucial variable to understanding how much and why dicta-
tors donate. The key informational variable is the knowledge that dictators have
about their partners. Similar to what occurs in the majority of experiments with
DGs, in our hypothetical experiment, dictators hardly donate anything when
the dictator lacks information about the recipient. But this is not due to a
problem of social distance, lack of reciprocity, or isolation. Those who lacked
information explained their decision with statements such as “I don’t know who
is going to get it, they might have more than me”, “I might need it for some-
thing more important than the recipients”, “if I don’t have any information
about who the money is going to or what it is going to be used for, I won’t
donate it” or “it could be someone who is richer than me”; statements which
were repeated time and again to justify their action. When information about
the recipient is lacking, it is perfectly legitimate to give priority to oneself: if
the money goes to someone who needs it less than I do, I would be doing an
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injustice to myself. Thus it has less to do with a question of social distance than
the fact that dictators make and analyze their decision whilst bearing in mind
that they live in an unfair society in which it is quite likely that the unknown
recipient will be better oﬀ economically than they are. In such a case there is
no moral obligation to give anything.10
Drawing on Hoﬀman, McCabe and Smith’s concept of social distance, we
propose a definition of moral distance as the degree of moral obligation that the
dictator has towards the recipient. If the experiment is designed in such a way
that donating is an actual obligation, the moral distance will be null and the
dictator ought to donate all or part of her resources according to her level of
well-being. In such a situation the dictator has the actual obligation to donate
since it ‘is an obligation which, in a particular situation, is not superseded by
any other obligation’ (Crawford 1969, 316).11 If the particular situation is such
that donating cannot be said to be an obligation at all, the moral distance will
be maximum.
Moral distance is not related to the personal closeness between the dictator
and recipient: the dictator can donate more money to a stranger than to an
acquaintance if the stranger needs it, however close they may be.12 Moral
distance depends on the relevant information that the dictator has regarding the
recipient’s situation and regarding her own situation. Nonetheless, anonymity
must be ensured in order to exclude any possible influence of reputation (I give
so that others see that I am giving). Now, the fact that one should donate does
not mean, of course, that dictators will do so, just as the absence of a moral
obligation to donate does not mean that one cannot give money. To be morally
10Of course this does not exclude generosity. In our hypothetical experiment no less than
28.6% of the subjects donate one-third of the money in spite of having no information about
the recipient. In Hoﬀman et al., eight per cent of the dictators donated half or less than half
of the money.
11Or in Zimmerman’s words, S has the obligation to do A when all other worlds are ‘deon-
tically inferior to some accessible world in which S does A’ (Zimmerman 1996, 26). When the
moral distance between the dictator and the recipient is null, donating is deontically superior
to not donating —in such a situation not donating is a world that is accessible to the dictator
and deontically inferior.
12Following upon Jonathan Glover, Abelson (2005) refers to moral distance as ‘the emotional
closeness between agent and beneficiary’ and states that ‘our moral obligations to aid vary
in strength with the emotional closeness to us of our fellows. When we know whom we are
aiding, that very fact brings our beneficiaries closer to us than unknown strangers, and we
feel more responsible for their well being’ (Abelson 2005, 35). In the experiments analyzed
here, there is no emotional closenesss between the dictator and the recipient. It has nothing
to do with knowing who the recipient is, but the recipient’s state of well being. Given that
the recipient is badly oﬀ, there is an obligation to help; an obligation which some fulfill -the
majority in this case- and others do not. It is this obligation, and not emotional ties, what
establishes the moral distance between dictator and recipient.
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obligated to do action A -donate- implies not only that one can do A, but also
that one cannot (Zimmerman 1996, 85-89). For this reason, the freedom that
the dictator has to give or not give and the greater or lesser moral distance
between the dictator and the recipient permits the behavior of the dictators to
be labelled in the following way:
a) If the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient is null and the
donations are also null or very low, the dictator behaves in a morally
egotistical manner.
b) If the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient is maximum and
the dictator donates nothing at all, the dictator behaves as a reasonably
self-interested individual.
c) If the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient is maximum
and the dictator gives part or all of her money, she performs an act of
generosity.
d) If the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient is null and the
dictator gives part or all of her money, her behavior is morally right.
Note that we are speaking about labelling dictator behavior, not about the
reasons for action. We judge behavior from the viewpoint of the observer (the
experimentalist), from the outside, from the point of view of one who observes
the moral distance between the dictator and the recipient and if the dictator
gives money or not. The reasons for action are unknown: perhaps the dictator
gave all the money -when, for example, moral distance is null- because the
experiment was conducted on a Monday, or perhaps she gives part of the money
when the moral distance is at its maximum because she was happy. Whatever
the reasons may be for action, behavior can be labelled from the viewpoint of the
experimentalist, as we did so above. Given the manner in which DG experiments
are usually conducted, it is not possible to determine the reasons for action, that
is, the internal perspective of the dictator. It is only possible to observe the
dictator’s conduct and speculate on her motives. What we can assert, however,
is that first, the behavior of many dictators deviates from the Nash equilibrium;
second, that social distance does not explain why dictators donate and third,
that the labels proposed here seem to fit the range of behaviors revealed in all
the DG experiments (moral behavior, generosity, reasonable self-interest, selfish
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behavior). These labels respond to moral distance and donations; two objective
categories that are independent of motivations.
It is interesting to note that all of these behaviors figure in the vast literature
on DGs, albeit they appear separately in a variety of experiments. We have
seen, for example, how dictators act with reasonable self-interest when lacking
information given that in a situation of this type they are morally distant from
the recipient. Even so, generosity is possible as some dictators donate part of the
money to an unknown recipient in a double-blind DG. Likewise, when dictators
have to divide legitimately earned money with the recipient they hardly donate
anything -95% of the dictators follow the game-theoretic predictions (Cherry et
al. 2002: 1218). In such a case, there is no actual obligation to donate since
the dictator obtained the money through her own personal eﬀort. Here the
moral distance with the partner is maximum, therefore making it legitimate to
defend one’s own interests.13 For whatever the reason, moral conduct arises
in experiments in which either the dictator has to divide the money that she
has produced with her partner (Ruﬄe 1998) or if she has to give money to
alleviate poverty and buy medicines (Brañas-Garza 2006). On these occasions
moral distance is null and there is an actual obligation to donate; an obligation
that the dictators usually fulfill.14 In these cases we also find self-interested
behavior. Given that the moral distance is null, there are those who keep all
the money. When we modify the circumstances surrounding the decision, we
will have both diﬀerent moral distances and diﬀerent outcomes.
Unlike what occurs in other experiments, here we have attempted to ap-
proach the internal perspective of the dictator, that is, the reasons that drive
the dictator’s behavior, to see if behavior and motivations merge, in other words,
if dictators donate money for moral reasons when moral distance is null. While
the quantitative analysis by Brañas-Garza (2006) found a spectacular increase
in donations when reducing the moral distance between the dictator and the
recipient, the analysis of the qualitative data presented here shows that the dic-
tators -without previous agreement, without communicating with one another
and under conditions of absolute anonymity- appeal to moral motivations such
as solidarity or helping the needy to justify their decision. To put it another
13Quite another thing is if the dictator obtains the money by her own means and is then
told that she has to divide it with a poor recipient or a poor and ill recipient.
14This does not mean that those who give nothing are self-interested: their behavior may
respond to the fact that they do not believe in the experiment or do not believe that the money
will reach its destination. In such a case their conduct would be reasonably self-interested.
But in order to determine this we must know the reasons for action.
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way, fulfilling one’s obligation to give does not seem to be a random choice
nor the result of non-moral reasons, but of moral reasons. Dictators seem to
"measure" moral distance well as they refuse to give money when they have no
information about the recipient, but do give it when they know the recipient is
poor or is poor and needs medicine. In our experiments the response (to give
or not to give) to the greater or lesser moral distance is generally tied to moral
motivations.
Because the justification is given following the DG, we can argue that this
is a mere post-hoc verbal justification that does not imply that the behavior we
call moral is actually the result of a moral judgement (Haidt 2001). As we stated
above that, the experiment analyzed here does not allow us to establish a causal
link between such behavior and the post hoc explanation for this behavior. But
perhaps this is not the proper way to approach this issue. As Scanlon argues,
judgements on what is right or wrong are not normal empirical judgements,
but ‘claims about what we have reasons to do’ (Scanlon 1998, 2). The fact
that the experimental subjects who donated all the money coincide in their
reasons for action; a coincidence that occurs without previous agreement or
group negotiation and pressure, seems to support the reasons the dictators gave
for donating in the specific context proposed to them. Although these are
undoubtedly post hoc reasons and we cannot aﬃrm that they cause the action
without committing a fallacy, there can be no doubt that it is quite a diﬀerent
ball game when dictators say they give money because their partner needs it
than when they make their decision by tossing a coin in the air. The partner’s
poverty seems to be suﬃcient grounds for the dictator to believe that she should
donate in a specific situation and for her to indeed donate.
There may be other circumstances in which the dictators give and yet their
behavior could be labelled as egotistical, since as we have seen the decision
comes cheap: the money they donate has come at no cost to themselves and
as many state, "won’t do them much good". In such circumstances morally
correct behavior is cheap. Perhaps this explains the high number of non-neutral
consequentialist responses that we detected in both experiments. Whatever the
case may be, it is interesting to confirm the coherency of the labels we have
chosen to use since those who appeal to reasons of a deontological nature do not
consider if their decision is cheap or not, but rather the duty of giving. This is
yet another indication that these are true reasons for action; a fact that would in
turn support the hypothesis that it is moral distance -the sense of obligation of
the kindness hypothesis- and not social distance which marks the diﬀerence in
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experimental DGs. What seems to be unquestionable is that the moral framing
determines dictators’ decisions.
5 CONCLUSION
In this article we have analyzed the qualitative results of the experiments con-
ducted by Brañas-Garza (2006). If experimental philosophy puts into question
what people believe, among other things, the DG can be a good tool to inquire
into the moral beliefs of experimental subjects. In the extensive literature on
DG experiments, speculation abounds as to why dictators give or do not give
money. Given that the actual behavior of dictators often has little to do with
behavioral assumptions in economics or game theory, experimentalists attempt
to find answers by appealing to a wide variety of reasons for action. In spite of
these diverse reasons, moral motivations carry a heavy weight in the hypothe-
ses of many experimental economists. For this reason we have analyzed two
experiments in which dictators were expressly asked about the reasons for their
action. The answers were anonymous and given under conditions of absolute
privacy. An overwhelming majority of the justifications were grounded in moral
reasons. Both the literature on DGs and the answers that were given in the
two experiments analyzed here, suggest that dictators do not take into account
social distance -the reciprocity between themselves and the recipient- but moral
distance, that is, the moral obligation to give depending on the circumstances
surrounding the problem.
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Appendix
Reasons given by subjects in the real experiment
S u b je c t E x t r a c t f r om th e a n sw e r s C a t e g o ry D on a t io n
1 T h e m o r e p e o p l e w i t h m ed ic in e s t h e b e t t e r C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
2 I d o n ’t b e l ie v e in th e a im o f t h e e x p e r im e n t D id n ’t t r u s t t h e e x p e r im e n t 0
3 S o l id a r i ty D e o n t o lo g i c a l 3
4 We a l l s h o u ld g iv e s om e m o n e y t o p u t a n en d t o in ju s t i c e D e o n t o lo g i c a l 3
5 T h i s m on e y is m o r e u s e fu l in t h e s e c o u n t r ie s C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
6 T h e i r s c a r c i ty C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
7 I c a n h e lp th em C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
8 S o l id a r i ty D e o n t o lo g i c a l 3
9 I c a n h e lp th em C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
1 0 T h e y n e ed it C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
1 1 I c a n h e lp th em C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
1 2 I b e l i e v e b e in g fa i r i s t h e b e s t d e c i s io n D e o n t o lo g i c a l 3
1 3 I p r e f e r [ . . . ] d o n a t in g th e m on e y p e r s o n a l ly D id n ’t t r u s t t h e s y s t em 1
1 4 T h e y n e ed it C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 2
1 5 I c a n h e lp th em C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
1 6 I c a n h e lp th em C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
1 7 I c a n h e lp th em C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
1 8 I h ave e n o u g h C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
1 9 T h e y n e ed it C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
2 0 T h e y n e ed it C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
2 1 S o l id a r i ty, e t h ic p r in c ip l e s D e o n t o lo g i c a l 3
2 2 I d o n ’t t r u s t in s om e o rg a n iz a t io n s D id n ’t t r u s t t h e s y s t em 2
2 3 2
2 4 I ’m ke ep in g w h a t ’ s m in e L e g it im a c y 2
2 5 T h e y n e ed it C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
2 6 P ro b lem s t o d is t r ib u t e th e m on e y am o n g r e c ip ie n t s D id n ’t t r u s t t h e s y s t em 1
2 7 M y d e c is i o n h a s b e e n r a n d om R a n d om d e c is i o n 2
2 8 T h i s m on e y is m o r e u s e fu l in t h e s e c o u n t r ie s C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
2 9 S h a r in g th e m o n e y th a t ’ s n o t m in e L e g it im a c y 2
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S u b je c t E x t ra c t f r om th e a n sw e r s C a t e g o ry D o n a t io n
3 0 3
3 1 I d o n ’t t r u s t a ny b o d y, I o n ly t ru s t m y s e l f D id n ’t t r u s t t h e s y s t em 1
3 2 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C on s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
3 3 M y m o t iva t io n h a s b e en t o e a rn s om e e x t r a m on ey E g o ism /H a rd sh ip 1
3 4 T h i s m on e y is m o r e u s e fu l in t h e s e c o u n t r ie s C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
3 5 L e s s fo r s om e p e o p le b u t m ed ic in e s f o r a l l C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
3 6 We a l l a r e a l l hum a n D eo n t o lo g ic a l 3
3 7 We a l l s h o u ld g o f o r t h e s am e in t e r e s t D eo n t o lo g ic a l 3
3 8 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C on s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
3 9 T h e im p o r t a n c e o f p ove r ty in th e T h i rd Wo r ld C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 2
4 0 T h e m o n e y i s fo r a g o o d d e e d D eo n t o lo g ic a l 2
4 1 I d o n ’t k n ow w h e th e r [ t h e e x p e r im e n t ] i s r e a l o r n o t D id n ’t t r u s t t h e e x p e r im en t 1
4 2 G en e r o s i ty D eo n t o lo g ic a l 3
4 3 A g o o d c a u s e D eo n t o lo g ic a l 3
4 4 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C on s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
4 5 3
4 6 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C on s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
4 7 1
4 8 3
4 9 H e lp in g th o s e w h o a r e m o s t n e e d y C on s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
5 0 H ig h e r u t i l i ty C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
5 1 J u s t t o p u t 3 num b e r s R a n d om d e c i s i o n 3
5 2 M y ow n p e r s o n a l i ty, m y fam i ly, m y e d u c a t io n . . . D e o n t o lo g ic a l 3
5 3 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C on s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
5 4 I c a n ’ t g iv e t o o n e c e n t e r a n d n o t t o th e o th e r s D eo n t o lo g ic a l 3
5 5 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C on s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
5 6 I n e e d th e m o n e y E g o ism /H a rd sh ip 1
5 7 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C on s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
5 8 1
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S u b je c t E x t r a c t f r om th e a n sw e r s C a t e g o ry D on a t io n
5 9 G o o d p u rp o s e C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
6 0 E v e ryo n e h a s t o h ave th e s am e o p p o r tu n it i e s D e o n t o lo g ic a l 3
6 1 T h e 1 5C= a r e ju s t t o p ay fo r m y p a r t ic ip a t io n in a s t a t i s t ic a l s t u d y L e g it im a c y 0
6 2 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
6 3 H ig h e r u t i l i ty C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
6 4 T h e y n e ed it C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
6 5 T h e y n e ed it C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
6 6 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
6 7 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
6 8 T h e y n e ed it C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
6 9 T h e b e s t u s e fo r t h e m on ey C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
7 0 I f w e a l l d o n a t e , . . , t h e re w i l l b e l e s s p ove r ty C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
7 1 T h e y n e ed it C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
7 2 I d o n ’t n e e d th e m on ey C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
7 3 T h e y n e ed it C o n s e q u e n t ia l i s t 3
7 4 To h e lp s om e o n e in a ny c a s e D e o n t o lo g ic a l 3
7 5 I h ave g iv e n th e m on ey r a n d om ly R a n d om d e c is io n 2
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